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From Outlaws to Ingroup:
Romer, Lawrence, and the Inevitable
Normativity of Group Recognition
Miranda Oshige McGowan t
INTRODUCTION
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Lawrence v.
Texas1 presents a problem of interpretation. Some aspects of
the opinion suggest that it is grounded in libertarianism; other
aspects suggest that it is grounded as much in the Equal Protection Clause as it is in substantive due process. Which is it?
Did the Court decide in Lawrence and Romer v. Evans2 that legislative acts backed solely by moral reasons will never survive
rational basis scrutiny? That is Justice Scalia's charge: "[Lawrence] effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation"3 because "the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice."4
It is also Justice Scalia's condemnation: "This Court has no
business imposing upon all Americans the resolution.., that
'animosity' toward homosexuality is evil." 5 Professor Randy
Barnett agrees with Justice Scalia that the Lawrence Court enshrines the harm principle, that the state may not curtail an
liberty absent economic or physical harm to othindividual's
6
ers, as a constitutional principle.7 He thinks, however, that we
t

Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. I wish to thank

the members of the Half-Baked Club as well as Bill Eskridge, Dan Farber, and
David McGowan for helpful comments and questions. All errors remain mine.
1. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).

2. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
3. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
5. Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
6. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1989) (1859).
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should congratulate, not denigrate, the Court for doing so.
Attempts to characterize Lawrence as an example of this
Court's libertarianism are wrong. Lawrence has not ruled out
moral distaste as a rational basis for state regulation. Though
Justice Kennedy's opinion contains some language to support
the notion that the harm principle has become a constitutional
principle, it is just rhetoric. Loose language aside, Lawrence
does not hold that the Constitution incorporates the harm principle. In fact, Lawrence is more of an equal protection case than
a substantive due process case. Justice Kennedy's opinion does
not talk about the rights of persons generally as against the
state. Rather, the opinion constantly refers to the rights of
"homosexual persons"' and the right of gays to make "choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy."9
These limitations and references to gays and lesbians are
as central to Lawrence's holding as are the references to liberty.
Gays and lesbians win in Lawrence and Romer, because the
challenged legislation explicitly targeted gays, and gays constitute a group that, in the Court's eyes, is socially salient. In this
respect, the Court sees gays and lesbians as being like persons
with disabilities' ° and hippies." In contrast, felons, nude dancers, and men who frequent strip clubs lose in Richardson v.
Ramirez 2 and Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. ,13 because felons and
nude dancers are not, in the Court's eyes, socially salient
groups. After Lawrence, it is more accurate to say that the
Court will strike state statutes that limit the liberties of a
group-like gays and lesbians, hippies, persons with disabili-

7. Randy E. Barnett, Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution, NAT'L REV.
ONLINE (July 10, 2003), at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/commentbarnett071003.asp.
8. See, e.g., Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 2481-82 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,

851 (1992)).
10. See generally City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432
(1985) (holding that a zoning law violated the Equal Protection Clause because
the city's only justification for it was animus towards persons with disabilities).
11. See generally United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973) (holding that a food stamp restriction violated the Equal Protection
Clause because it was purposefully designed to prevent hippies from receiving
food stamps). For a discussion of the case, see also infra text accompanying

notes 174-81.
12.
13.

418 U.S. 24 (1974).
501 U.S. 560 (1991).
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ties, or people who sacrifice animals as part of their religion 14if the state's reason for the regulation is grounded in moral distaste for the group.
This conclusion, however, raises a problem with which the
Court has not yet come to grips. The Court does not have a consistent approach for differentiating "groups" from mere classifications of individuals. Put slightly differently, the Court has
not articulated why gays and lesbians, hippies, and the disabled are socially salient groups that merit recognition under
the Fourteenth Amendment while felons and nude dancers are
not.
The Court seems to think that it is using a kind of social
fact analysis, which resembles Professor William Eskridge's
analysis of identity-based social movements. 5 The Court, however, is doing more than describing the social landscape. Indeed, the Court's analysis is much more normative than descriptive.
I do not intend this observation as a criticism. The Court's
recognition of the social fact that some people compose a group
(and are not just a bunch of people who do the same thing) is
inherently normative, because the Court's recognition inevitably and necessarily legitimizes that group and its acts. Once
the Court has recognized a group, it requires the government to
articulate reasons beyond moral distaste for regulating that
group. Granting even this minimal protection creates an inevitable feedback loop by removing much of the stigma associated
with being a member of the group. This feedback loop has been
at work in Romer and Lawrence. These two cases have removed
much of the stigma associated with being gay or lesbian. Being
gay or lesbian is significantly less costly now-both emotionally
and otherwise-than it was even ten years ago. Because the
Court's recognition of a group's existence constructs and legitimizes that group, the Court has only recognized and protected
those groups whose common conduct it considers worth protecting.
14. See generally Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (declaring unconstitutional a city ordinance that
banned religious ritual animal sacrifice).
15. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based
Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001) (describing
the evolution of "identity-based social movements" as a process in which law
provides stigmatized groups with a forum to object to exclusion and discrimination at the hands of hostile groups, and thus lay claim to constitutional
rights which courts should protect).
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Let me first turn to explaining why it is wrong to cast Lawrence as a libertarian decision. My discussion begins with the
first Supreme Court victory for gays and lesbians, Romer v. Ev16
ans.
I. LAWRENCE DOES NOT ENACT THE HARM PRINCIPLE
A. ROMER, AND THE RECOGNITION OF GAYS AND LESBIANS AS A

SOCIAL GROUP

In 1992, Colorado voters passed "Amendment 2" to their
state constitution. 7 It precluded the state and local governments from outlawing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. This meant that if gays and lesbians wanted legal
protection from sexual orientation discrimination, they would
have to amend the state constitution. 8 According to the state,
Amendment 2 just "put[] gays and lesbians in the same [legal]
position as all other persons," as people may freely discriminate
against one another except on the basis of special, prohibited
categories, such as race, sex, national origin, religion, and
color."'

The Court flatly rejected Colorado's argument in Romer,
holding that Colorado's Amendment 2 denied gays and lesbians
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 A law
that makes it "more difficult for one group of citizens than for
all others to seek aid from the government is ... a denial of

equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense."2 '
Amendment 2's denial of equal protection was unconstitutional
because it bore no "rational relationship to legitimate state interests."22 Amendment 2 "had the peculiar property of imposing
a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named
group, an exceptional and.., invalid form of legislation." 23 The
breadth of the disability the amendment imposed on gays, lesbians, and bisexuals also was completely "discontinuous with

16. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
17. Id. at 623.
18. Id. at 626-27.
19. Id. at 626 (noting also that "the State says Bthe measure does no more
than deny homosexuals special rights").
20. Id. at 623.
21. Id. at 633 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 632.
23. Id. (emphasis added).
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the reasons offered for the amendment."24 So discontinuous, the
Court found, that only "animus" toward gays, lesbians, and bisexuals could explain it. 25 Animus towards a group is never a
"legitimate" reason for state regulation: "If the constitutional
conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it
must at the very least mean that a bare.., desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."28
After Romer, was Bowers v. Hardwick27 still good law?
Hardwick, after all, had sustained Georgia's conviction of Michael Hardwick for same-sex sodomy under rational basis scrutiny.28 In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court answered "no." 9 Since
1973, Texas made same-sex sodomy between consenting adults
a crime. 0 John Lawrence and Tyron Gardner were charged and
convicted under this law after police discovered them having
consensual sex in Mr. Lawrence's bedroom.3 1 The Court held32
that earlier sexual privacy cases-Griswold v. Connecticut,
Eisenstadt v. Baird,33 Roe v. Wade, 34 and PlannedParenthoodv.
Casey 3 5-required the conclusion that individuals have the
right to have sex with partners of the same sex:
[Aldults may choose to enter [into sexual relationships] in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their
dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression inintimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected
by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this
choice.'6

Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Lawrence explic-

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 634 (emphasis added) (quoting United States Dep't of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
27. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the constitutional right to privacy
did not encompass the right to engage in same-sex sodomy), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
28. Id. at 196.
29. 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2483-84 (2003).
30. Id. at 2479-80 (citfng 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 399, codified as TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 2003)).
31. Id. at 2475-76.
32. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
33. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
34. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
35. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
36. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2478.
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itly overruled Hardwick. Criminal sodomy laws and the
Court's opinion in Hardwick "demeaned the lives" of gays and
lesbians and stigmatized them as individuals.38 Texas, furthermore, had no legitimate reason for its criminal sodomy
statute. Texas argued that it was permitted to prohibit immoral acts.3 9 But the Court disagreed. "[Tihe fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a
law prohibiting the practice." ° Texas's justification seemed only
to compound the equal protection violation rather than to ameliorate it; prohibiting an activity because it is deemed immoral
necessarily stigmatizes and demeans the people who engage in
it.
After Lawrence one thing is clear: All state laws prohibiting sodomy are now unconstitutional. Just what else Lawrence
and Romer mean is the question of the day.
B. THE LIBERTARIAN BRIEF FOR LAWRENCE AND ROMER

Both critics and proponents of Romer and Lawrence point
to them as evidence of the Court's libertarian leanings.4 On
this account, Romer and Lawrence stand for the proposition
37. Id. at 2484.
38. Id. at 2482.
39. Respondent's Brief at 41, Lawrence, (No. 02-102) (arguing that Texas's
law against same-sex sodomy "rationally furthers other legitimate state interests, namely, the continued expression of the State's long-standing moral disapproval of homosexual conduct, and the deterrence of such immoral sexual
activity, particularly with regard to the contemplated conduct of heterosexuals
and
bisexuals"),
available at http://supreme.usatoday.findlaw.com/
supreme-court/briefs/02-102/02-102.resp.pdf.
40. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
41. For example, Professor Barnett praises the Court for embracing the
libertarian harm principle, see supra note 7 and accompanying text, while the
Web site CitizenSoldier.org decries Lawrence as throwing out "the last remaining tie in American law to the Judeo-Christian moral principles our nation
was founded upon" in favor of libertarian principles, see Lawrence v. TexasAmerica Dies, Citizen Soldier, at www.citizensoldier.org/deathofamerica.html
(last visited Mar. 13, 2004). See also Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2595 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the Court for putting an end to "all morals legislation");
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-BasedJustificationsfor Lawmaking: Before and
After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1282-84, (claiming the
Court's "consistent disinclination" to allow morals rationales to justify lawmaking indicates that "mere reference" to morality will not justify government
action, and arguing that "the Court's avoidance of morals rationales as the exclusive justifications for government action is not only reasonable" but also
inevitable.)
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that the Court will strike state restrictions on liberty if a state
cannot show that the restriction protects third parties from
physical or economic injuries. Without some evidence that economic or physical harm will result, moral disapproval for an activity will not justify restrictions on individual liberties.
The evidence that the Court has embraced the harm principle is largely by way of negative implication and the Court's
use of vague language. In both cases, the Court appears to hold
that morality does not satisfy even minimal rational basis scrutiny. Romer does not hold that gays are a suspect class, which
would warrant strict or intermediate scrutiny.42 Rather, Romer
deploys rational basis scrutiny, and the Court rejects the
proposition that Coloradoans' moral distaste for gays and lesbians is a rational justification for treating gays and lesbians differently than others.4 3 In Lawrence, the Court never says that
gays and lesbians have a fundamental right to sexual privacy.44
Here, too, the Court appears to apply rational basis scrutiny
(though it never actually specifies the level of scrutiny).4 5
The Court's opinion in Lawrence also takes seriously
Texas's arguments that same-sex sodomy would undermine
morality in Texas, and it acknowledges that many people seriously and sincerely condemn sodomy and homosexuality as
immoral: "For many persons [objections to homosexual sex] are
not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted
as ethical and moral principles to which they aspire and which
thus determine the course of their lives. 46 But the Court
strikes down the ban anyway; however deeply and sincerely
held, these moral beliefs do not count as rational justifications
to restrict the liberty of gays and lesbians. Twice, then, the
Court has held that morality does not rationally justify restrictions on liberty.
Justice Kennedy's opinion also invokes language reminis42. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
43. Id. at 632, 635.
44. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2492 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Not once
does [the Court] describe homosexual sodomy as a fundamental right' or a
").
'fundamental liberty, ....
45. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that the majority applied
rational basis scrutiny to strike Texas's ban on same-sex sodomy). The fact
that Lawrence overrules Hardwick, which upheld Georgia's sodomy ban on the
ground that moral disapproval of sodomy and of gays was a rational justification for the statute, suggests that Lawrence itself applies rational basis scrutiny. See id. at 2483-84.
46. Id. at 2480.
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cent of the harm principle. He speaks very broadly of "liberty,"
not of "fundamental rights."47 Perhaps most strikingly, he
stresses the fact that the Texas ban "seek[s] to control a personal relationship [that] is within the liberty of persons to
choose without being punished as criminals." 8 "This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State to...
define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries
absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects.4 9 In a case involving only consenting adults, there is no
such harm. 0 This caution sounds like the harm principle: The
state should not curtail personal freedom absent harm to others.
Lawrence also subtly alters the substantive due process
"history and tradition" analysis. According to the majority, the
question is not whether the right to engage in sodomy is
grounded in the history and tradition of our nation.5 ' Rather,
the question is whether there has been a long-standing tradition of treating sex between same-sex partners differently under the law than sex between members of the opposite sex. 52
The Court brushes aside the fact that state and common law
had long prohibited sodomy, as these laws were rarely enforced
against private sexual acts.
Lawrence's alteration of history and tradition analysis suggests that the Court no longer presumes the validity of state
restrictions of liberties, regardless whether a liberty has traditionally been considered fundamental. The history and tradi-

47. See, for example, the first sentence of Justice Kennedy's analysis, stating that "[w]e conclude the case should be resolved by determining whether
the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution." Id. at 2477 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 2478.
49. Id.
50. Justice Kennedy wrote:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons
who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships
where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public
conduct or prostitution .... The case does involve two adults who,

with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual
practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.
Id. at 2484.
51. See id. at 2478-79.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 2479 ("Laws prohibiting sodomy do not seem to have been enforced against consenting adults acting in private.").
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tion inquiry now asks whether traditionally a specific activity
has been actively regulated by the states. What the state has
not traditionally and actively regulated seems to fall into the
realm of "liberty," and states will need to justify their incursions into that realm.
Were there any remaining doubts about the Court's libertarian leanings, Justice Kennedy appears to banish them with
this declaration: Justice Stevens was right in Hardwick that
"[o]ur prior cases make.., abundantly clear [that] the fact that
the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice."54 Justice Kennedy concludes that Justice Stevens's reasoning "should have been controlling in [Hardwick], and should control here."55
Lawrence certainly gives devotees of the harm principle
much to celebrate. Yet, construing Lawrence as libertarian
misses a crucial aspect of the case-the fact that Texas's sodomy statute banned only sodomy between gays and lesbians.
Because the state restricted the liberties of gays and lesbians,
the Supreme Court struck the statute.
C. THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF LAWRENCE
To overturn Hardwick, the Lawrence Court had to do one
of two things. First, it could have decided that Hardwick was
wrong when it decided that the Constitution does not include a
fundamental right for gays and lesbians to have sex. The Lawrence Court does criticize Hardwick, but it never holds that the
private, sexual liberties of gays and lesbians are fundamental
ones. Lawrence instead speaks of "rights" and "liberties" unadorned by adjectives. Second, the Court could have decided
that Hardwick was wrong on its own terms-that criminal sodomy laws had no rational basis. Though it never says so directly, the Court appears to have taken this latter tack.56
1.

The Court's Puzzling Claim to Value Neutrality
The Court acknowledges that for many people, including

54. Id. at 2483 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)).
55. Id. at 2484.

56. Justice Scalia points out that the Court uses the language of rational
basis when it holds, "The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest

which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual." Id. at 2492 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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apparently the people of Texas, homosexuality is a serious
moral issue based on "profound and deep convictions.., to
which [these people] aspire and which thus determine the
course of their lives."57 This fact appears to complicate rather
than resolve the dispute in Lawrence: "The issue is whether the
majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views
on the whole society through operation of the criminal law."" In
Lawrence, the Court describes its obligation under the Constitution as "to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own
moral code."59
Framing the issue this way is startling-the Court inverts
the usual criticism of substantive due process analysis. The
usual critique of substantive due process analysis is that the
Court necessarily defines a particular moral code for the country when it decides that some unenumerated rights are so fundamental that democratic majorities may not curtail them. °
The process of culling among rights, anointing some to be fundamental and beyond regulation, and deeming others to be less
so and subject to regulation, both relies upon and creates a code
of values.
From this perspective, the Court's statement in Lawrence
simply makes no sense. The Court is mandating a moral codeone that protects the sexual liberties of gays and lesbians because those liberties are more important than the moral preferences of a majority of Texans. The usual critique of substantive
due process would advise that the Court could only avoid mandating a moral code by leaving the decision to regulate sodomy
to legislatures.
Does the Lawrence Court have any basis for saying that its
task is to "define the liberty of all, not to mandate [its] own
moral code,"6 ' or is this just so much rhetoric? I will argue that
the Court is right, because a contrary decision would have decided as a constitutional matter that gay and lesbian personal
relationships are different and lesser than heterosexual rela57. Id. at 2480.
58. Id.

59. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
60. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293301 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the Court's substantive due
process jurisprudence as inherently subjective and arguing that "[tihis Court

need not, and has no authority to, inject itself into every field of human activity where irrationality and oppression may theoretically occur, and if it tries to
do so it will destroy itself").
61.

Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 850).
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tionships. The Court's description, therefore, is not a rhetorical
flourish.
2. The Analogy to Griswold, Eisenstadt,and Roe
The Lawrence Court begins its analysis of the rights of
gays and lesbians with Griswold v. Connecticut, 2 Eisenstadt v.
Baird,6 3 and Roe v. Wade.6 4 These cases look like an odd place to
start, as they all dealt with the right to decide "whether to bear
or beget a child." 65 This right is not at issue in Lawrence.

But these cases-especially as the Court interpreted them
in Casey-strongly imply that states could not constitutionally
criminalize heterosexual sodomy. Justice Harlan's objections to
state regulation of the use of contraceptives by married persons
would apply with full force to state regulation of a couple's
choice of particular sexual practices. He wrote in dissent in Poe
v. Ullman that state restrictions on the use of contraceptives
were unconstitutional:
[T]he State is asserting the right to enforce its moral judgment by intruding upon the most intimate details of the marital relation with
the full power of the criminal law. Potentially, this could allow the

deployment of all the incidental machinery of the criminal law, arrests, searches and seizures; inevitably, it must mean at the very
least the lodging of criminal charges, a public trial, and testimony as
to the corpus delicti. [No] elaboration of presumptions, testimonial
privileges, or other safeguards, [could] alleviate the necessity for tes-

timony as to the mode and manner of the married couples' sexual relations, or at least the opportunity for the accused to make denial of
the charges.6

Whether a state enforces a law against contraceptive use
or a law against sodomy, the state equally invades marital relationships. Police would have to search homes and bedrooms for
evidence of the couple's sex practices; to defend themselves
against conviction, spouses would be forced to divulge details of
their relationship ordinarily shielded by the marital testimonial privilege.6 7 It is one thing, Justice Harlan continued, for

the state "to forbid extra-marital sexuality altogether, or to say
who may marry, but it is quite another when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it under62. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
63. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
64. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
65. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
66. 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

67. Id.
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takes to regulate by means of the criminal law the details of
that intimacy."68 States despoil marital intimacy whenever they
regulate the private, sexual conduct of married couples,
whether by forbidding them to use contraceptives, or by criminalizing sodomy.
Eisenstadt extends Griswold's protection from "unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child" to unmarried persons. 69 Eisenstadt is an equal protection
case, not a substantive due process case. The Court uses the
Equal Protection Clause as a kind of rights ratchet to expand
the universe of people entitled to exercise the liberty interest
established by Griswold.0 Eisenstadt finds that there is no
principled distinction between married and unmarried people.7'
The right to marital privacy (Griswold) thus becomes in Eisenstadt the more general right to sexual privacy. 72
With Eisenstadt in place, concluding that the Constitution
forbids states from prohibiting heterosexual sodomy becomes
pretty easy. Indeed, shielding heterosexual sodomy from state
regulation is a far easier case than Roe, as the constitutional
right of abortion must mediate between competing liberty and
life interests.73
Were there any doubts about this conclusion, the Casey
plurality dispels them. Casey transforms Griswold's holding
that married couples have a right to privacy and autonomy to
conduct their married lives into the more general holding that
individuals have a right to autonomy in their private sexual
lives. Though it trims the scope of a woman's right to abortion,
Casey emphasizes that GrEisenRoe are not merely about the
right to prevent and terminate pregnancies. The plurality
writes:
Our precedents have respected the private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter ....

These matters, involving the most intimate

and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central
68.
69.

Id. at 553.
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1971).

70. Id. (holding that "whatever the rights of the individual to access to
contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the
married alike").
71. Id. at 454 (stating that "the State could not, consistently with the
Equal Protection Clause, outlaw distribution [of contraceptives] to unmarried
but not to married persons").

72. Id.
73.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1973).
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to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and
of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.7"

The right of married people to conduct their intimate lives
free from government regulation is now just one specific instance of the more general individual right to make decisions
about the details of one's family life and one's sexual relationships. After Casey, the scope of "family life" sweeps broadly as
well. For abortion rights to be about "family life," the concept of
"family life" must be capacious enough to include individuals
who have relationships outside of marriage and without children, and indeed it must also include individuals who have sex
without the "relationship."
If this analysis is right, then the Lawrence Court was half
right to say that its role was "to define the liberty of all, not to
mandate our own moral code."7 5 The Court's statement implies
that leaving gay sodomy subject to state regulation would not
be a morally neutral decision. The Court is correct. To hold that
the Fourteenth Amendment permits democratic majorities to
prohibit gay sodomy, the Court would have to distinguish gay
sex from straight sex. Griswold's analysis appears to protect a
full menu of sexual acts between husbands and wives, including sodomy; the Court thus could not distinguish gay sex from
straight based on the kinds of activities involved. Eisenstadt
forecloses the sanctity of the marital relationship as a basis for
distinguishing gay sex from straight sex, and Roe and Casey
foreclose the definition of sex as a procreative act to serve as a
basis for such a distinction.
To distinguish gay sex from straight sex, then, the Court
would have to hold that the sexual relationships of loving, gay
couples are different from those of unmarried heterosexual
couples, and that they are less important to the lives of gay persons than they are to heterosexuals. The Court articulates this
problem explicitly: "[The] continuance [of Hardwick] as
precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons. The
stigma this criminal statute imposes ...is not trivial.7 6 Leav74. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (citation and quotations omitted).
75. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2480 (2003) (quoting Casey, 505
U.S. at 850).
76. Id. at 2482.
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ing the status quo in place is not a morally neutral decision.
But the Court is only half right, because the Court's decision in Lawrence is also not morally neutral. This does not
weaken Lawrence's constitutional legitimacy. No morally neutral decision was in fact possible. The decision certainly reflects
a particular moral outlook. Lawrence holds that criminal sodomy statutes demean the lives and sexual relationships of gay
persons. The Supreme Court strikes sodomy statutes because
states have no legitimate interest in demeaning gays and lesbians. 77 As far as the Constitution is concerned, gay and lesbian
relationships deserve as much protection from state interference as straight relationships: "Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do."78 Permitting states to deprive gays and
lesbians of this autonomy would denigrate their relationships
as deviant and undesirable. Once GrEisenRoe puts the bedroom
out of bounds, the moral impetus to denigrate gay relationships, the Court declares, cannot be rational. When the Court
forbade states from criminalizing sodomy, the Court declared,
in essence, that gays have a right not to be demeaned or stigmatized.
D. HERE'S THE RUB: ALL LAWS STIGMATIZE AND RESTRICT THE
LIBERTIES OF GROUPS
There is a catch to the Court's declaration. Justice Scalia
rightly objects in Lawrence that all criminal laws stigmatize
the prohibited conduct and by extension stigmatize people who
do the prohibited act.7 9 The fact that the Court considers this
kind of stigma unconstitutional in Lawrence leads Justice
Scalia to believe that the Court has adopted the harm principle, 80 but his conclusion is too quick. The Court's analysis in
other cases involving restrictions on liberties for moral reasons
demonstrates how centrally important it is to Lawrence that
Texas singled out gays and lesbians and sought to control only
77. Id. at 2484.
78. Id. at 2482.
79. See id. at 2495-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that laws that regulate sexual behavior reflect society's belief "that certain forms of sexual behavior are immoral and unacceptable"); cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I had thought that one could consider certain
conduct reprehensible-murder[,] ... or polygamy, or cruelty to animals-and

could exhibit even 'animus' toward such conduct.").
80. See Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that
the Court has "effectively decree[d] the end of all morals legislation").
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their sexual relationships. Let me begin my explanation of this
point by contrasting Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.' with Lawrence.
In Barnes, Indiana defended the application of its public
indecency law to nude dancers in adult-only strip clubs. The
dancers at the Kitty Kat Lounge and Glen Theatre wanted to
dance completely nude. They sued to enjoin the enforcement of
an Indiana public indecency statute requiring dancers to wear
pasties and g-strings."' Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion for the Court held that the dancers' naked gyrations were
First Amendment expression.83 Over Justice Scalia's vituperative concurrence,84 the plurality required Indiana to justify the
public indecency statute under intermediate scrutiny. 5 Chief
Justice Rehnquist observes that the "statute's purpose" is to
"protect[] societal order and morality." 6 Statutes like this one
plainly "reflect moral disapproval of people appearing in the
nude among strangers in public places."87 The plurality concludes, without any fuss, that bans on public indecency fit well
within "[tihe traditional police power of the States... to provide for the public health, safety, and morals" of their citizens.88
Consequently, Indiana's requirement that nude dancers wear
pasties in strip clubs "furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality."89
Indiana's reason for prohibiting public nudity was very
similar to Texas's reason for banning same-sex sodomy. Indiana wanted to stigmatize nude dancers and people who frequented nude clubs as criminals and their conduct as indecent
and immoral. Barnes, however, upholds Indiana's restriction,
even though the fit between the statute and public decency was
81. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
82. Id. at 563 (plurality opinion) (noting that the statute required that
dancers wear "pasties" and "G-strings"). The owners of these clubs also joined
the lawsuit. Id. (plurality opinion).
83. Id. at 565-66 (plurality opinion).
84. Justice Scalia would only have required Indiana to demonstrate that
the law had a rational basis. Id. at 580 (Scalia, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 567-68 (plurality opinion) (holding that Indiana's public indecency statute "furthers substantial governmental interests"); see also id. at
579 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The plurality purports to apply... an intermediate level of First Amendment scrutiny.").
86. Id. at 568 (plurality opinion).
87. Id. (plurality opinion). To be fair, Indiana also seems to disapprove of
people being nude around their friends in public.
88. Id. at 569 (plurality opinion).
89. Id. (plurality opinion).
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far more opaque than the pasties the dancers have to wear under Indiana law. Think about it-after Barnes the dancers have
to wear pasties. Lap dances with pasties are not much more decent than lap dances without pasties. Lap dances in anything
short of footed pajamas would not meet any definition of "decent" in any of Justice Scalia's dictionaries.9" The Court ignores
the limited effect that this statute would actually have on the
moral tone of South Bend. The only "public" that ever saw nude
dancers at the Kitty Kat Lounge were people who knew what
they would find when they walked in off the street-and they
would only be offended by the club's "decency," not its indecency. Patrons wanted to see what Indiana did not want them
to see, and the Court lets Indiana impose its moral preference
that the patrons' preferences be made illegal.
How can it be that Indiana's moral preferences outweigh
the free expression rights of nude dancers and the liberty interests of their patrons, but Texas's moral preferences do not outweigh the liberty interests of gays and lesbians? As a legal matter, Barnes would seem to present the more compelling
constitutional case. The Court assumed that the dancing was
protected expression, so the Indiana law had to satisfy intermediate scrutiny. Indiana justified the statute solely on
grounds of morality, and the evidence of the statute's enhancement of South Bend's moral tone was skimpy at best.
Nevertheless, the strip club goers and nude dancers lost. The
plurality opinion upheld the statute because states, after all,
have a substantial interest in morality.9 '
90. Actually, footed pajamas would be kinky. My imagination is either far
too limited or far too active to come up with a garment that would render lap
dancing "decent."
91. Professor Suzanne Goldberg argues in this symposium that Barnes
demonstrates the Court's increasing acceptance of the harm principle, in part
because only four Justices in Barnes accepted the proposition that morality
standing alone could justify limits on expression. Goldberg, supra note 41, at
1270. Justice Souter-the fifth vote to uphold Indiana's statute-concurred
separately on the grounds that ameliorating the deleterious secondary effects
from nude dance clubs was a substantial enough state interest to justify the
limits on the dancers' expression. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter is silent about the state's interest in morality, but the fact
that he wrote a separate concurrence on other grounds suggests he disagreed
with the plurality's reasoning. Professor Goldberg rightly points out that the
Court is uneasy with stand-alone moral justifications for government restrictions on personal liberty. See Goldberg, supra note 41, at 1282. But, at this
point in the Court's history, I disagree that the Court's unease has ripened
into an across-the-board rejection of laws that seek solely to improve the morality of the citizenry. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and

1328

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 88:1312

The Court appears to believe that the stigma of same-sex
sodomy laws is notable because it is directed toward gays and
only gays. Unfortunately, this objection does not really distinguish same-sex sodomy laws from other laws. 9 The public indecency statute in Barnes surely stigmatized the set of guys who
Kennedy have never indicated that they would reject Barnes's reasoning or
outcome today. Justice Scalia faulted the Court opinion for giving too little
deference to the state's interest in morality. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. Similarly Justice Thomas explains in his dissent in Lawrence
that morality-based restrictions on liberties might be silly and misguided, but
they are nevertheless constitutional. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2498
(2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
In assessing whether the Court has indeed declared the end of morals legislation, it is also important to ask what level of scrutiny the Court is applying
in the various cases. The Court upholds the state law in Barnes under intermediate scrutiny-the state's interest in morality was sufficiently important to
justify the incursion on free expression. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 569-70 (plurality
opinion). At the end of 2003, it is fair to say that in cases to which intermediate scrutiny applies, there is no stable consensus within the Court as to
whether morality standing alone will satisfy intermediate scrutiny. The Court
has not been squarely presented with the issue since Barnes, and it is not
looking for an opportunity to reconsider Barnes. Indeed, the Court dodged the
opportunity to answer that question squarely in City of Erie v. Pap'sAM., 529
U.S. 277 (2000), which upheld a public indecency statute that was nearly indistinguishable from Indiana's. Id. at 278. The state in Pap's A.M., however,
had presented evidence to the trial court that strip clubs and other adult entertainment businesses increased prostitution, drug sales and use, and crime
in the areas in which they were located. Id. at 297-98. The Court thus did not
have to decide the more contentious issue-whether morality is a substantial
or important state interest. Griswold and Roe, however, make it plain that a
state's interest in morality alone is not a compelling state interest and could
not withstand strict scrutiny. How the Court will handle morals legislation
under rational basis scrutiny is the most interesting question, and the one I
address here.
92. This distinction may not be true as a factual matter, either. People
who do not identify as gay, lesbian, or bisexual sometimes experiment with
having sex with partners of the same sex. In a 1992 survey of Americans about
sexuality, about four percent of women surveyed reported that they had had
sex with a woman at some point in their lives, two percent said that they had
had sex with a woman in the last year, but only 1.4 percent of women identified themselves as lesbian or bisexual. The survey also found that about three
percent of men had had sex with men but did not identify as gay. ROBERT T.
MICHAEL ET AL., SEX IN AMERICA: A DEFINITIVE SURVEY 174-77 (1994). There
are even nicknames for young women who experiment with having sex with

other women during college: L.U.G.s (Lesbians Until Graduation). See, e.g.,
Deirdre Dolan, Lesbian Lolitas: High-School Girls Want to Be Gay-ish, N.Y.
2002,
http://www.nyobserver.com/pages/
Dec.
12,
OBSERVER,
story.asp?ID=6716 ("While 'L.U.G.'s' (lesbians until graduation) became a
term of derision in the 1990's-applied to college women who slept with
women on campus but would immediately link up with socially appropriate

males once they left college-the trend seems to have worked its way into a
younger crowd.").
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visited totally nude clubs and stigmatized nude exotic dancers.
The public indecency statute and the prosecution of the Kitty
Kat Lounge reflected the state's moral distaste for the kinds of
people who would like to appear nude in public and who frequent totally nude clubs; Indiana offered no other justification
for its statute.
E. TOWARD A WORKABLE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "GROUPS"
AND "CLASSIFICATIONS"

Why don't the liberties of nude dancers and strip club goers
count, and the liberties of gays do? Because the Court thinks
(and I would agree) that gays as a set are a group, while the set
of nude dancers and people who go to strip clubs are not a
group, in the Equal Protection Clause sense. It is therefore
more accurate to say that the Court will strike state statutes
that restrict the liberties of groups, if the state's reason for the
regulation is grounded in moral distaste.
This conclusion dovetails with the Court's analyses in
Church of the Lukumi BabaluAye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,93 City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,94 and Plyler v. Doe.9 In
Lukumi Babalu Aye, the Court struck a city ordinance that
banned animal sacrifices "for any type of ritual"-whether or
not the animal would be eaten.9 6 The city of Hialeah, Florida,
passed the ordinance when members of the Church of Santeria
decided to open a church, school, and cultural center in the
town.97 Ritual animal sacrifice is an integral part of the Santeria religion.98 Some Hialeah residents balked at practicing
members of this church living in their midst, and the city council acted quickly to ban animal sacrifice. 99 The city council
drafted the statute narrowly so that it would ban only the types
of slaughter and sacrifices that the church practiced; it exempted kosher animal slaughter, hunting, euthanasia, killing
animals for food if it was not part of a ritual, and pest eradication.'00 During a city council meeting, citizens and city council
members specifically disparaged and denounced the Church of
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

508 U.S. 520 (1993).
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
508 U.S. at 524, 527.
Id. at 526, 527.
Id. at 524.
Id. at 526-27.
Id. at 537.
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Santeria and its practices.101 Hialeah justified the ban as furthering the health, safety, and morals of its citizens.
The Court struck the ban because the ban's narrow scope
and the town's disparaging comments revealed that the city
council passed the ban "because of, not merely in spite of," residents' desire to suppress Santeria religious practices."' Moreover, the statute's narrow scope meant that it did not further
the city's purported health and safety aims or its purported
concern for animal welfare.104 The statute's only real purpose
was to drive members of the church from the city of Hialeah
and to brand them and their religious practices as deviant and
illegal.105
Similarly, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc., the Court found that a city zoning regulation violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it required a group home for
persons with mental disabilities to get a special use permit before it was allowed to operate.106 The Court concluded that the
city imposed this regulation because of prejudice against persons with disabilities. 7 Had the group home's residents not
had mental disabilities, it could have opened without a special
use permit.0 8 The Court held that disabled persons were not a
suspect category. 10 9 But the city had no rational basis for requiring group homes for persons with mental disabilities to get
special use permits, but not fraternities, nursing homes, hospitals, or boarding houses."0 The city had worried about the
"negative attitude" of nearby property owners and of students
at a nearby junior high school"' and worried about the possibil-2
ity that the home's residents would be injured in a flood."
These concerns, the Court found, "rest[ed] on an irrational
101. Id. at 541-42.
102. Id. at 528.
103. Id. at 540.
104. See id. at 544-45.
105. See id. at 540-42 (citing evidence that citizens and members of the
city council believed that the Santeria religion was immoral and concluding
that "the ordinances were enacted because of, not merely in spite of their suppression of Santeria religious practice" (internal quotations omitted)).
106. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
107. Id. at 450.
108. Id. at 437.
109. Id. at 442-43.
110. Id. at 446-48.
111. Id. at 448-49.
112. The home was situated on a 500-year flood plain. Id. at 449.

2004]

FROM OUTLAWS TO INGROUP

1331

prejudice against the mentally retarded""13 and were indistinguishable from "a bare desire... to harm a politically unpopular group."" 4
Plyler v. Doe may provide the closest analogue to Lawrence.
In the 1970s, Texas prohibited school districts from using state
funds to educate illegal aliens and required them to deny admission to undocumented alien children." 5 The Court held
these restrictions violated the Equal Protection Clausedespite the fact that alienage is not a suspect class and education is not a fundamental right."6 The state argued that its restrictions husbanded scarce educational resources, enhanced
education for its citizens and legal aliens, and discouraged illegal aliens from migrating to Texas. 1 71 The Court deemed these
"insubstantial" reasons to deny public education to undocumented alien children, largely because Texas's cost savings
were low, and Texas could not explain how excluding undocumented children improved education or how it discouraged migrants from coming to Texas."18 The restrictions would, however, ensure that undocumented alien children would inhabit a
permanent, illiterate subclass in the United States."9 In other
words, the Texas law unconstitutionally cemented illegal aliens' status as outsiders.
The Lawrence Court recognized that the same-sex sodomy
ban similarly stigmatized gays and lesbians convicted under
the statute.' 20 If their convictions were sustained, the Court observed that John Lawrence and Tyron Garner would "bear on
their record the history of their criminal convictions.' 2 ' Were
they to move from Texas, at least four states would require
them to register as sex offenders.' 22 Texas's criminalization of
same-sex sodomy threatened to impose palpable injuries and
legal disabilities on gays and lesbians that extended far beyond
moral condemnation of their acts. This aspect of the Lawrence
113. Id. at 450.
114. Id. at 447 (ellipses in original) (quoting United States Dep't of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
115. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982).
116. Id. at 230.
117. Id. at 228-30.
118. Id. at 230.
119. Id. at 223.
120. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2482 (2003).
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing statutes in Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and
Idaho).
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Court's opinion closely parallels the Court's reasoning in Lukumi BabaluAye, Cleburne Living Center, and Plyler.
II. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN GROUPS
AND CLASSIFICATIONS
To say that the Court will strike state statutes that restrict
the liberties of groups if the state's reason for the regulation is
grounded in moral distaste raises a new problem. If all laws
classify, and if most prohibitions stigmatize the behavior they
restrict, then the question becomes: When does a law restrict
and stigmatize some class of activities (nude dancing), and
when does a law restrict and stigmatize the activities of a
group (gay sodomy)? The Court must think that these are different situations, because it only rejects moral distaste as a sufficient justification in the latter case.
But what makes these situations different? The difference
cannot lie in Romer's assertion that some laws are meant to
stigmatize, and only to stigmatize a group. 123 Romer's assertion
begs the question I wish to answer. If it is true that all
legislation grounded in morality classifies and stigmatizes the
prohibited behavior (and by extension the people who do the
prohibited things), then Romer merely restates the question.
What we need to know is how to distinguish between morals
legislation that restricts and stigmatizes some class of activities
(say, nude dancing) and morals legislation that restricts and
stigmatizes the activities of a group (gay sodomy).
A. JUST THE [SOCIAL] FACTS, MA'AM

To the extent that I can discern a pattern from its cases,
the Court appears to be trying to use a descriptive social-fact
analysis that partly resembles Professor William Eskridge's description of identity-based social movements. Professor Eskridge identifies racial groups, feminists, gays and lesbians, and
the disabled as the major identity-based social movements
(IBSMs) of the twentieth century. 124 As Professor Eskridge describes it, IBSMs formed in response to comprehensive systems

123. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) ("If the constitutional
conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very
least mean that a bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest." (quoting United States Dep't of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973))).
124. Eskridge, supra note 15, at 423-24.
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of legal regulation that treated some characteristic or behavior
as the norm, while punishing people who deviated from that
25
norm and excluding them from full political participation.
These legal restrictions pulled people with these characteristics
together into groups. These "groups of otherwise dissimilar
people came to feel that they were, because of their [legal] classification, 'similarly situated.' 126 Over time, people began
1 27 to
consider these traits as an essential part of their identity.
Identity-based social movements fight to abolish laws that
norm.128
treat their trait as a "malignant" deviation from the
They want the law to stop treating people with these traits as
threatening and malign. At the very least they want the law to
stop punishing them and excluding them from political and social life. Ultimately, IBSMs want their characteristics to be accepted as "benign" variations from the norm.129 Historically, the
Court has not extended constitutional protection to an IBSM
until the political and social consensus that the IBSM and its
trait are malignant has begun to break down. The Court generally waits until society tolerates a group to some extent before
extending constitutional protection to it. 1 3 Thus, the Court de-

cided Brown after President Truman desegregated the military,' Cleburne Living Center after Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act, 132 and Craigv. Boren after the Equal Pay Act and

125. Id. at 425-26.
126. Id. at 433.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 467-68, 478-79.
129. Id. at 478-79.
130. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993
Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 54 (1994). Professors Eskridge and Frickey argue:
If anything, the Court's equal protection jurisprudence has shown an
"inverted Carolene" quality: so long as a group really is politically
marginalized, the Court will tolerate virtually any action by Congress
or the States that adversely affects the minority; it is only when a minority is becoming a key player in national politics that the Court
constitutionalizes longstanding concerns about discrimination.

Id.
131. Brown v. Board of Education held that segregation in public schools
was unconstitutional in 1954, 347 U.S. 483, 495, six years after President
Truman's executive order desegregated the military in 1948, Exec. Order No.
9981, 3 C.F.R. 722 (1943-1948).
132. Cleburne found no rational basis for requiring a group home for the
mentally handicapped to obtain a special use permit in 1985, 473 U.S. 432,
449-50, more than ten years after Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 to ensure that handicapped persons were not denied access to jobs, train-
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Title VII.1
Professor Eskridge's account seems to fit with the Court's
approach in Lawrence and the other cases discussed above. The
fact that the Lawrence Court could plausibly analogize gay sex
(Lawrence)to unmarried sex (Eisenstadt)3 4 means that gay sex
is now-in Professor Eskridge's vocabulary-a "tolerable"
variation of sex. Similarly, in Lukumi Babalu Aye the Court
tamed the exotic practice of animal sacrifice by situating it
within the traditions of Judeo-Christian and Islamic religious
practices. Plyler brought compassion to the plight of the children of illegal immigrants, emphasizing that by excluding them
from public school Texas sought to burden innocents who have
committed no crime but with that of their parents. 1 6 And in
each of these cases, the Court has been right as a descriptive
matter that these groups are groups in an important social
sense and not just "sets" or "classifications" of people who have
some activity in common.
B. THE INEVITABILITY OF NORMATIVE ANALYSIS

A closer examination of the Court's cases reveals that the
Court's practice is essentially normative. The Court is not just
describing the existing social landscape. A comparison of
Richardson v. Ramirez13 7 and Romer demonstrates this point.
In Ramirez, the Supreme Court rejected an equal protection
challenge to California's law that denied felons who had completed their sentences the right to vote. 38 The California constitution prohibited persons who had been convicted of a felony
ing, or public facilities, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (2000)).
133. Craig v. Boren rejected gender-based discrimination in the sale of alcohol in 1976, 429 U.S. 190, 210, more than ten years after Congress prohibited discrimination against women in the workplace in the Equal Pay Act of
1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206
(2000)), and in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78
Stat. 25 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2000h (2000)).
134. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2493 (2003).
135. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 524-25 (1993) (noting that animal sacrifices were mentioned
throughout the Old Testament, were important to the early practice of Judaism, and remain a part of current Islamic practices).
136. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219-20 (1982) (holding that illegal
immigrant children were not responsible for their parents' violations of law
and could not constitutionally be punished for their crimes).
137. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
138. Id. at 56.
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from voting. 3 9 An individual who wanted to register to vote had
to sign an affidavit stating whether he had ever been convicted
of "a felony [that] disqualifies [him] from voting."14 ° People with
felony convictions who had completed their sentences could not
vote, unless they had petitioned for, and been granted, a pardon from the Governor.1 4 ' In practice only a tiny fraction of ex-

convicts could vote. California said that denying felons the
right to vote preserved "the purity of the ballot box" against
abuse by "morally corrupt and dishonest voters."' The exconvict plaintiffs argued that the California law denied them a
fundamental right-the right to vote-in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.
The Court rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection challenge without ever entertaining its merits. The Court upheld
California's disenfranchisement of ex-convicts under Section 2
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 44 Section 2 specifies how congressional representatives will be apportioned among the
states. Most relevantly, it provides that if "the right to vote"

was "denied to any of the male inhabitants" of the state who
were citizens and at least twenty-one years old, the state's
"representation [in Congress] shall be reduced" proportion-

ately.4 5 States, however, could deny men the right to vote "for
participation in rebellion, or other crime," without reducing
their number of representatives.4 According to the Court, the
phrase "or other crime" encompassed felonies in general.'4 7 The
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court reasoned, must therefore

139. Id. at 27 (citing the relevant portion of the California constitution).
140. Id. at 28.
141. Id. at 30.
142. Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Cal. 1973), rev'd sub nom.
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). Felons who had been sentenced to
prison had to be certified as "rehabilitated" by a California superior court and
granted a pardon by the Governor. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 30. The Governor
could not pardon a person who had been convicted of two felonies unless a majority of the justices of the California Supreme Court concurred. Id. at 30 n.7.
Between 1968 and 1971, California released more than 34,000 people from
state prisons and restored the right to vote to fewer than 300. Id. at 31 n.8. In
1973, the California Supreme Court estimated that more than 100,000 persons
were ex-felons. Ramirez, 507 P.2d at 1347 n.2.
143. Ramirez, 507 P.2d at 1349.
144. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 54-55.
145.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

§ 2.

146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 53-54.
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permit states to deny felons the right to vote. 148
The Court's reading of Section 2 is not bulletproof. The
phrase "or other crime" can be read just as plausibly to modify
the phrase "for participation in rebellion." Read this way, "or
other crime" broadens "participation in rebellion" to include
acts against the Union that fell short of actual participation in
the Civil War. This reading harmonizes nicely with the overall
purpose of Section 2-to penalize states that denied AfricanAmericans the right to vote, but149to permit states to prohibit
former Confederates from voting.
The more serious objection to the Court's conclusion, however, is that it begs the question whether Section 2 immunizes
laws stripping felons of their voting rights from equal protection scrutiny. Just because Section 2 provides that such denials
will not reduce a state's representation in Congress, it does not
necessarily mean that states are authorized to deny the right to
vote or to impose other civil disabilities, such as exclusion from
jury service, to all who have been convicted of "other crimes."15 °
One could still ask whether the extent of the disability or the
manner in which it was imposed denied felons equal protection
of the laws. It is not inconsistent to leave a state's representation in Congress in place if it denies felons the right to vote,
and to strike those state statutes that do so in a manner that
denies felons equal protection of the laws. Additionally, Professor David Shapiro has argued that there is absolutely no evidence-either in the text or legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment-suggesting that Section 2 bars judicial
review under the Equal Protection Clause of state schemes that
stripped felons of their civil rights."' The legislative history
cited by the Court suggests at most that Congress knew that
some states deprived felons of the right to vote, and that Congress did not intend to reduce a state's representation on that
ground. 1 2 The Court's reasons for declaring felon disenfran148. Id. at 43, 53.
149. See Alec C. Ewald, "Civil Death": The Ideological Paradoxof Criminal
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 1045, 1104
(explaining that Section 2 was intended "to allow states to disenfranchise former Confederates, after Congress decided not to do so itself").
150. Brief of the American Bar Association, Amicus Curiae at 5, 17-20,
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (No. 72-1589).
151. David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90
HARv. L. REV. 293, 303-04 (1976).
152. See Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 45-48 (detailing comments by congressmen
pertaining to Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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chisement laws beyond the reach of the Equal Protection
Clause fail to justify that conclusion.
More generally, the Ramirez Court's question-begging
analysis reveals how inconsequential felons' voting rights are to
the Court and how reasonable it seemed to strip felons of these
rights. 5 3 The practice of stripping felons of their civil rights
does indeed have a long history, extending back to the
Greeks."" The Greeks believed that felons forfeited their civil
rights because a felony was a crime against society."' Felons, in
effect, banished themselves." 6 According to the Greeks, felons
lived in "infamy.""7 Earlier provisions of the California Constitution had referred to felonies as "infamous crimes" in a nod to
this Greek concept."' Being stripped of civil rights communicates an unambiguous message: You are no longer one of us.159
As a matter of descriptive social fact, felons who have com-

153. Had the Supreme Court considered the merits of the question, California's disenfranchisement of felons appeared to violate the Equal Protection
Clause. Indeed, the California Supreme Court had found that California's law
violated the Equal Protection Clause. See Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d 1345,
1357 (Cal. 1973) (striking California's disenfranchisement of felons because a
statute penalizing voter fraud, rather than "outright disfranchisement of persons convicted of crime," is the best way to prevent fraud and the "the least
burdensome" on the right to vote), rev'd sub nom. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418
U.S. 24 (1974). Just the year before, in Dunn v. Blumstein, the Supreme Court
had found Tennessee's durational residency requirement for voter registration
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 405 U.S. 330, 353-54 (1972). The Supreme Court had applied strict scrutiny because voting is a fundamental right.
Tennessee had asserted that durational residency requirements were necessary to prevent voter fraud, just as California asserted its disenfranchisement
of felons was. In striking Tennessee's durational residency requirement, the
Court had found that if a state "supplement[s] its voter registration system"
with a panoply of criminal sanctions punishing election and voter fraud, "it
can hardly argue that broadly imposed political disabilities such as durational
residence requirements are needed to deal with the evils of fraud." Id. at 35354. California laws regulating the voting process and criminalizing its misuse
were even stricter than Tennessee's-certainly "more than adequate to detect
and deter whatever fraud may be feared." Ramirez, 507 P.2d at 1356 (quoting
Dunn, 405 U.S. 330 at 353).
154. Walter M. Grant et al., Special Project, The CollateralConsequences of
a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 941-42 (1970) (describing ancient Greek practice of stripping felons of all of their civil rights).
155.

Id.

156. United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Randolph,
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
157. Id.
158. Ramirez, 507 P.2d at 1346.
159. Boney, 977 F.2d at 638 (Randolph, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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pleted their sentences seem to be a "group." A person's status
as a felon affects many different aspects of his economic, social,
and political life. Felons are among the most discriminated
against groups in America. 160 Most job applications ask whether
the applicant has ever been convicted of a felony, and most employers will not knowingly hire people who have a criminal record.' 6 ' Felons often cannot be bonded, which means that felons
cannot hold jobs that require them to handle money, and state
and federal law prohibit felons from holding certain types of
jobs. 162 Being a former felon forges a persons' identity-if by
nothing else, than by mere force of circumstance and treatment
by those on the outside.
If group protection under the Constitution is solely an empirical matter, the equal protection case for felons should be an
airtight one-a reviled group has been stripped of a fundamental right. Indeed, in Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court found
that by prohibiting all legislative, executive, or judicial action
163
that would protect gays and lesbians from discrimination,
Colorado's Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection
Clause.164 A law that makes it harder "for one group of citizens
than for all others to seek aid from the government" violates
the Equal Protection Clause in "the most literal sense." 6 5
160. A recent Urban Institute study found that employers were less willing
to hire former felons than they were any other disadvantaged group, such as
applicants who only had a GED, were on welfare, had a spotty work history, or
were unemployed. HARRY J. HOLZER ET AL., URBAN INST., CAN EMPLOYERS
PLAY A MORE POSITIVE ROLE IN PRISONER REENTRY? 14 (2002),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410803_PositiveRole.pdf. There is little
information about the unemployment rate of former felons, but a study of California parolees in the 1990s suggested that fewer than twenty-one percent of
parolees had full-time jobs; ex-convicts also make less than people without
criminal records. JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., URBAN INST., FROM PRISON TO HOME:
THE DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER REENTRY 38 (2001),

http://www.urban.org/pdfs/from-prison to home.pdf, see also DINA ROSE &
TODD CLEAR, URBAN INST., INCARCERATION, REENTRY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL:
SOCIAL NETWORKS IN THE BALANCE 186-87 (2002) (documenting myriad diffi-

culties that former felons have in finding employment due to social stigma of
having
a
criminal
record),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
410623_SocialCapital.pdf.
161. Two-thirds of employers surveyed in five major cities said that they
would not "knowingly hire an ex-offender" and "at least one-third checked the
criminal histories of their most recently hired employees." Travis et al., supra
note 160, at 31.
162. Holzer et al., supra note 160, at 4.
163. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
164. Id. at 635.
165. Id. at 633.
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The Romer Court disavowed Davis v. Beason,66 which had
upheld an Idaho statute that denied the right to vote to polygamists and people who advocated polygamy. 167 The Romer
Court observed that "to the extent [that Davis] held that the
groups designated in the statute may be deprived of the right to
vote because of their status, its ruling could not stand without
surviving strict scrutiny, a most doubtful outcome." 168 Yet in the
same breath that it disavows this aspect of Davis and strikes
Amendment 2, the Romer Court explicitly affirms that "[t]o the
extent Davis held that a convicted felon may be denied the
right to vote, its holding is not implicated by our decision and is
169
unexceptionable."
The Court cites Ramirez for this proposi70
tion.'
After Romer, ex-convicts remain out in the cold even
though the state's only real interest in stripping ex-convicts of
their civil rights is moral disapproval. Romer's disavowal of exconvicts is somewhat incongruous, as before Lawrence was decided, felons and gays had a lot in common (and not just a tradition that can be traced back to the Greeks). Sodomy laws
were an important way for communities to brand gays as
criminals (even if only symbolically, if sodomy laws were unenforced) and to render them outsiders and strangers to the community, as Professor Christopher Leslie's work has documented
in great detail.17 1 In states where sodomy was a felony,7 2 a conviction could be used to strip a gay man or a lesbian of the right
to vote. Additionally, the logic of Dunn v. Blumstein 113 and Romer strongly imply that denying felons the right to vote raises
serious issues under the Court's equal protection and funda166. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
167. Id. at 347-48.
168. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted
by "Unenforced"Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 115 (2000) (explaining that even unenforced sodomy laws were used by states to "defmt[el a
specific class of Americans as inferior and ...

remove them from view").

172. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972) (defining sodomy as a
"detestable and abominable crime against nature," punishable with up to ten
years in prison); see also Alliance of Sodomy Supporters, United States Sodomy Laws, at http://www.sodomy.org/laws (Jan. 28, 1998) (compiling penalties
for sodomy in various states).
173. 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (striking state minimum residency requirement
for new state residents to register to vote because it unconstitutionally infringed the right to vote); see supra note 153.
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mental rights jurisprudence.
C. HIPPIES-A STIGMATIZED CASTE?

So why is it that the Court can hold so casually that denying felons the right to vote is "unexceptionable"? Two cases decided contemporaneously with Ramirez shed light on this issue.
In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,74 the
Supreme Court struck a statute that had been designed to disadvantage hippies; and in Parrv. Municipal Court,"' the California Supreme Court did the same thing.
Moreno struck down a late-1960s food stamp eligibility
regulation that denied benefits to households that contained
unmarried adults. 176 The legislative history showed that Congress had crafted this limitation to make sure that hippies living in communes would be ineligible for food stamps and could
not leech off of the tax-paying citizens of this great country. 7 '
Applying rational basis scrutiny, the Court struck down the

food stamp restriction. The Court held:
The challenged classification clearly cannot be sustained by reference
to this congressional purpose. For if the constitutional conception of
"equal protection of the laws" means anything, it must at the very
least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.
As a result, "[a] purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot, in
and of itself and without reference to [some independent] considerations in the public interest, justify the 1971 amendment."17 '

If this language sounds familiar, that is because it is: Romer quotes directly from this passage in Moreno when it holds
that Colorado's desire to strip gays of their protection under lo79
cal antidiscrimination laws is not a legitimate state interest.
This language, "a bare.., desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government interest,"
S
181
actually originated in the district court opinion in Moreno.
174. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
175. 479 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1971).
176. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 532-33.
177. Id. at 534 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1793, at 8 (1970), and 116
Cong. Rec. 44,439 (1970) (statement of Sen. Holland)).
178. Id. at 534-35 (alterations in original) (quoting the district court opinion, Moreno v. United States Dep't of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 n.11
(D.D.C. 1972)).
179. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634.
180. See Moreno, 345 F. Supp. at 314 n.11 ("In order to qualify as 'legitimate' under the Equal Protection Clause, a legislative purpose must arguably
be related to the improvement of the general welfare. . . . The mere intent to
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That opinion cited Parr v. Municipal Court, the other hippie
case, for this precise proposition."
In Parr,the California Supreme Court struck a 1968 Carmel-by-the-Sea ordinance that prohibited persons from sitting
or lying on the grass in Carmel's parks. Carmel had passed the
ordinance to discourage hippies who might otherwise try to
move the Summer of Love south to Carmel's beaches and
parks. 182 Using rational basis scrutiny, the California Supreme
Court struck Carmel's ordinance on equal protection grounds.
Carmel's "discriminatory antagonism [was] unmistakable" in
its "description of the problem" that purportedly required it "to
prohibit sitting or lying in the park."'83 Carmel violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it "use[d] official Municipal
Code language to single out a social group and stigmatize its
members as 'undesirable' and 'unsanitary." 81 4 At the same time

it also stigmatized "the entire class of youthful Carmel visitors
whose mode of dress and life style differ from and irritate the
majority of the residents and tourists in the city."'85 Perhaps
somewhat hyperbolically, Justice Mosk inveighed, "[Wie cannot
be oblivious to the ...avowed[ purpose ...

of the ordinance in

question: to discriminate against an ill-defined social caste
harm a politically unpopular group will not suffice." (citation omitted)).
181. Id.
182. Carmel's brief to the Court had urged the California Supreme Court to
examine the historical context and the conditions existing prior to enactment of the ordinance:
We hope the court will not shut its eyes to matters of public notoriety
and general cognizance. We hope the court has seen the instant slum
created in the Haight-Ashbury. We hope the court has seen the deterioration if not destruction of the Telegraph-campus in Berkeley; we
hope the court has seen the squalor and filth of the communes in Big
Sur, and the damage caused by the sheer numbers of this transient
phenomenon. The court may be aware that Carmel had become a
meeting place-a mecca-for the hippies who had become disenchanted with the Haight-Ashbury and Berkeley. Regarding this ordinance we hope that the court observed the conditions existing prior to
its enactment. The mass of humanity that occupied the park smothered the grass by their very numbers. The grass competed with and
struggled against the overwhelming effect of heavy usage-cigarettes,
bottles, knives, and just plain people.
Parr v. Mun. Court, 479 P.2d 353, 357-58 (Cal. 1971) (quotations omitted) (citing the brief for the city of Carmel, Brief for Respondent and Real Party in Interest at 11-12, Parr(No. 26, 594)).
183. Id. at 358.
184. Id.
185. Id. (noting that the "Carmel City Council made no effort to define the
term 'hippie' so as to limit the application of its hostile rhetoric to persons who
are engaged in illegal conduct").

1342

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 88:1312

whose members are deemed pariahs by the city fathers." 86 In
short, the ordinance could not stand because it was, as Professors Tussman and tenBroek had said, an "expression[] of hostility or antagonism to certain groups of individuals." 87
D. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN GROUPS AND
CLASSIFICATIONS IS BASED ON A NORMATIVE JUDGMENT
Moreno and Parrbring us right back to where we started.
The Court pronounces that the Equal Protection Clause forbids
laws that are intended to disadvantage a group. The Court says
that gays, lesbians, hippies, people who engage in ritual animal
sacrifice, illegal immigrants, and persons with disabilities
count as "groups," but it does not say why that is the case. At
the same time, the Court says that felons, nude dancers, and
men who go to strip clubs are not "groups," but does not say
why not. Can we find a basis for saying that some of these
categories of people make up "groups" and the others do not?
It might be said that some of these groups are "identity"
groups, and the Court grants constitutional protection to identity groups. But this answer is unsatisfactory because it is both
too powerful and too weak. It is too powerful, because it suggests that the Court would extend group recognition to groups
that it has not (for example, felons and polygamists). Moreover,
whether some activity constitutes personal identity is highly
individual and may be difficult for the Court to pin down as an
empirical matter.
It is too weak, because the idea that identity marks the distinction between categories of persons and groups in the
Court's eyes cannot explain the Court's treatment of some
groups that simply cannot be described as identity groups.
Take illegal immigrants. Illegal immigrants who associate with
other illegal immigrants increase their risk of getting caughtand most illegal immigrants would prefer to lose their status as
"illegal" immigrants to become legal ones.
Nor does the Court rely on the social fact of association
among people with similar tastes and preferences to distinguish socially salient groups from mere categories of individuals. Association has not been sufficient to create a group in the
Court's eyes-there are an endless variety of fetish chat rooms

186. Id. at 360.
187. Id. at 355 (citing Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341, 358 (1949)).
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and Web sites on the Internet, but the Court is not going to
recognize "furries" 8' as an identity group any time soon.
Instead, Ramirez, Moreno, Cleburne, Romer, and Lawrence
reveal that that the Court's decision to treat some classifications of persons as "groups," but not others, is an essentially
normative one. And it has to be normative. When the Court has
recognized as a constitutional matter the social fact that some
people compose a group and are not just a bunch of people who
happen to do the same thing, it has always required a state to
articulate a reason-some reason, even a thin one, but a reason
nonetheless-to curtail that group's liberties. Social disapproval and moral objections do not count as reasons.
This minimal level of protection inevitably and necessarily
legitimizes the group (and their acts), because it means quite
literally that the Court deems moral objections and social disapproval to be irrational.Consequently, the Court only recognizes and protects those groups whose common conduct is seen
as worth protecting. As Professor Eskridge might say, the
Court grants a group constitutional protection when the Court
and society have come to see the conduct at issue as a tolerable
or benign deviation from the norm.
Granting a group protection-even such minimal protection as making states say something more than "yuck, we don't
like this activity"-also creates an inevitable feedback loop by
making group identification and membership far less dangerous and costly. As with American Express, so with the Equal
Protection Clause: Membership has its privileges. Romer and
Lawrence have removed much of the stigma that had come with
being gay. Being gay or lesbian is significantly less costly
now-both emotionally and otherwise-than it was even ten
years ago. 8 9 The same has been true for racial groups. It is no
188. For more on "furries," see Dan Savage's column, Savage Love,
http://www.thestranger.com/2002-08-08/savage.html (Aug. 8-14, 2002).
189. If movies and television are any indication, over the last ten years,
Americans have become increasingly tolerant of gays and lesbians. Ten years
ago in the movie Philadelphia,a straight actor, Tom Hanks, played a sympathetic gay lawyer who was dying of AIDS. Tom Hanks's portrayal sought to
persuade viewers that his character deserved our sympathy and affection. And
Tom Hanks made that point explicit in his (in)famous Oscar acceptance
speech. (As you may recall, he also "outed" his high school drama teacher.)
Five years ago, Rupert Everett, an out gay actor, played Julia Roberts's sexy
and gay best friend in My Best Friend's Wedding. Four years ago, Everett
played Minnie Driver's suitor and "ideal husband" in An Ideal Husband. Two
years ago, he was Reese Witherspoon's suitor in The Importance of Being Earnest. And now, every Tuesday night on Queer Eye for the Straight Guy, five
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accident that black pride emerged as a movement after Brown
v. Board of Education'" and after Loving v. Virginia,19 not before. "Latinos" and "Asians" exist as a racial group and not
merely as a term for separate and very different national origin
groups in part because identifying as a racial group confers advantages. The movement for women's rights similarly grew in
strength after Congress passed the Equal Pay Act and Title VII
and after the Court protected a woman's right to contraceptives
in Griswold. These gains, in turn, paved the way for Roe and
the Court's gender equal protection jurisprudence in the 1970s
and 1980s.
CONCLUSION
The conclusion that the Court grants constitutional protection to socially salient groups whose common conduct it deems
worth protecting is ironic. It stands the Carolene Products
mantra of "discrete and insular minorities" 92 on its head: A
group will not receive Constitutional protection until it has already achieved a substantial measure of social acceptance and
legal protection. That protection, in turn, may solidify group
identity. Truly discrete and insular minorities may find cold
comfort in the Constitution.
This conclusion implies a further irony: If I am right about
what the Court is saying and doing, then the logic of group recognition of Lawrence undercuts the Court's rhetoric about
Hardwick having been wrong when it was decided. 93 IfI have
gotten the Court right, then Lawrence is not about timeless
principles like the harm principle. Lawrence is about harms to
topical, sociological groups. If I have gotten the Court's logic
right, then Hardwick may have been correctly decided in 1986,
and it would have been correct in the 1960s and 1970s at the
time of GrEisenRoe. Indeed, under the Court's logic, Hardwick
only became wrong once the Court decided in Romer that gays

handsome, wise, and stylish gay men improve the life of some hapless straight
man by dispensing both fatherly advice on how to shave correctly (with, not
against, the grain) and treat a woman, and hip-older-brother advice on how to
decorate, dress, dance, coif, and woo.
190. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
191. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
192. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (noting
that more searching review may be appropriate where a statute manifests

'prejudice against discrete and insular minorities").
193. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
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as a group deserved the equal protection of the laws.
One concluding irony. In Romer, Justice Scalia is partially
correct when he inveighs that the "Court [has] take[n] sides in
the culture wars" by extending to gays and lesbians the legal
protections that GrEisenRoe gives to heterosexuals.19 Justice
Scalia is wrong to say the Court will no longer tolerate moralsbased legislation, however. Lawrence suggests only that the
Court will not tolerate the unequal treatment of members of a
recognized group who claim for themselves a right the Court
has deemed fundamental, and which the legislative majority
claims for its own members but seeks to deny to persons in the
group. It is only in this sense-the meanness inherent in claiming for one's self that which one would deny others-that "animus" or abstract morality has been reined in.

194. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 653 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion as being "the product of a Court, which is the product of a lawprofession culture ... that has largely signed onto the so-called homosexual
agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the
moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct").

